Technical document
Forge integrity
How each stone is born, where the randomness comes from, the odds of each rarity, what prevents fraud and how everything can be checked afterwards. And, just as clearly, what this document still cannot guarantee.
- The engine is the program that simulates the formation of the stone: the environment, the temperature, the pressure, the chemistry and the growth of the crystal. The version says which set of rules was used. A published version never changes: the same seed on the same version always generates exactly the same stone, today or years from now.
- v1frozen on October 4, 2026
- The process that measures, once for each engine version, how often each type of stone forms. It forms millions of test stones and publishes the frequencies, the tier cutoffs and the check. All the probabilities on the site come from it, and it only changes when a new engine version is released.
- 310 millionsimulated formations, on October 4, 2026
- Forges per person per day
- 40
- Reviewed on
- SHA-256 of the engine sources
- d2f4af0085bf88fc79c6192eb1c0a6bc191295861554cea3f8788e282c54ae1b
- Public signing key
- Ed25519, published
This document is written by Gênese itself from the code in use. It is not the opinion of an independent expert: what it states can be checked with the procedures in section 6, and what cannot yet be checked is listed in section 7.
§ 01
What this document attests
- The stone is a function of the seed. With the same seed and the same engine version, the same stone always comes out, on any computer.
- The seed is fixed before the forge. The confirmation shows the commitment to the server seed; once the forge exists, nothing changes the result.
- Whoever forges neither chooses nor predicts the result. The server seed stays secret until the day ends, and the forge counter only moves forward.
- The odds are public and measured. The rarity tiers come from 310 million simulated formations using the same formulas as the forge.
- Every stone has a digital signature. A stone invented outside the forge does not pass the public verification.
§ 02
The formula
Each forge produces a 256-bit seed through the formula below, and the engine turns that seed into the stone:
seed = HMAC-SHA256(serverSeed, clientSeed + ":" + nonce)
pedra = motor_v1(seed)The engine is a pure program: it does not read the clock, the network, files or the system's random generator, and it does not use mathematical functions that vary from one processor to another. From the seed, it always follows the same steps: the geological environment, the physical conditions (temperature, pressure, cooling and others), the chemistry (the base mineral and the trace elements), the growth of the crystal, the events after formation (radiation, heating, fractures, erosion and others), the species, the final attributes (color, purity, weight and phenomena) and, lastly, the rarity.
The random numbers for each step come from an xoshiro128** generator initialized with the SHA-256 of the seed and the name of the step. Each step always consumes the same amount of numbers, whether or not the event happens: one step never changes what the others receive.
Frozen versions. The version of the formation engine in use has been frozen since October 4, 2026: the SHA-256 of its sources is checked on every run of the tests, and any change creates a new version. The stone keeps the version that formed it and is rebuilt by that version forever.
Cutting without randomness. In cutting, the result depends only on the decisions of the person cutting (the cut, the position and the size). The same decisions always give the same cut stone.
§ 03
Where the randomness comes from
The seed joins three parts:
- serverSeed: the server seed, one per account per day (from 00:00 to 23:59 Brasília time), 256 bits long, calculated by the server with HMAC-SHA256 from a platform secret. Before each forge, the confirmation shows its commitment (the SHA-256 of the serverSeed), never the serverSeed itself.
- clientSeed: the account seed, shown in the confirmation together with the commitment.
- nonce: the number of the forge within the day (0, 1, 2…). Each forge consumes the next one, in the same transaction that records the forge and deducts from the day's limit; the number never repeats and never goes back.
The reveal. The serverSeed of a day appears in the verification of each stone once the day has passed and no forge made with it is still closed, waiting to be opened. From then on, anyone can check that its SHA-256 is the commitment shown before the forge and rebuild the stone's seed.
Why no one can predict it. Without the serverSeed, the seed of the next forge is unpredictable: HMAC-SHA256 behaves like a pseudorandom function, and knowing the seeds of past days says nothing about those of the following ones. Whoever forges sees the commitment but cannot extract the serverSeed from it: SHA-256 cannot be reversed.
The daily limit. Each person forges up to 40 stones per day, and the limit resets at 00:00 Brasília time. A confirmed forge counts even if the stone is discarded.
§ 04
The odds of each rarity
A stone's rarity is the probability of its combination of attributes, written as “1 in X”. The tiers below come from the calibration of the engine in use: 310 million simulated formations on October 4, 2026, with public seeds and the same formulas as the forge. The measured frequency of each tier comes from 100 million formations, with a 95% confidence interval.
| Tier | “1 in X” | Target | Measured | 95% CI |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Common | below 10 | 90% | 90% | 89.99% – 90% |
| Uncommon | from 10 to 100 | 9% | 9.001% | 8.995% – 9.007% |
| Rare | from 100 to 10,000 | 0.99% | 0.99% | 0.9881% – 0.992% |
| Epic | from 10,000 to 1,000,000 | 0.0099% | 0.01006% | 0.009869% – 0.01026% |
| Legendary | 1,000,000 or more | 0.0001% | 0.000099% | 0.00008132% – 0.0001205% |
The combinations. Ten stored stones of the same tier form a new stone: from the next tier, with the chance in the table below, or from the same tier. Each fragment of the same rarity, up to 5, adds a little to the chance. The decision comes from the same daily serverSeed, the clientSeed and a nonce; the new stone is the first candidate of the decided tier, in a fixed order:
v = HMAC-SHA256(serverSeed, clientSeed + ":combinacao:" + nonce)
ok = u32(v[0..8]) < ⌈p · 2³²⌉
seed_i = HMAC-SHA256(serverSeed, clientSeed + ":combinacao-" + i + ":" + nonce), i = 0, 1, 2…| From | To | Chance | With 5 fragments |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common | Uncommon | 25% | 40% |
| Uncommon | Rare | 10% | 20% |
| Rare | Epic | 5% | 10% |
| Epic | Legendary | 1% | 2% |
Every forge delivers a stone. There is no empty result.
The complete numbers (species, varieties, environments, phenomena, weight and purity) are on the Probabilities page.
§ 05
What prevents fraud
- Choosing the seed
- Whoever forges sends no seed at all: the server builds the seed from the day's serverSeed, the account's clientSeed and the next nonce. The forge request carries the commitment the person saw; if the day has rolled over, the forge is refused instead of using another seed.
- Repeating until a rare one comes out
- The nonce only moves forward, and each confirmed forge consumes one, in the same transaction as the day's limit. Discarding the stone does not give back the forge or the seed.
- Knowing the result beforehand
- The day's serverSeed does not leave the server until the day ends, and not even afterwards while there is a closed forge waiting to be opened.
- Inventing a stone
- Each stored stone receives an authenticity code: the Ed25519 signature of a message with the stone's id, the seed hash and the engine version. Without the private key, no one can produce a code that passes verification, and changing any part of the message invalidates the signature.
- Altering a stored stone
- The verification rebuilds the stone from the seed and the version, without trusting what is stored, and checks the signature. Swapping a stone's seed breaks its signature.
- Changing the engine later
- Frozen versions are checked by hash in the tests. A change to the engine creates a new version, and older stones continue to be rebuilt by their own version.
- Demonstration stones
- Demonstration collections exist only in the preview environment, flagged in the database. The tools that create them refuse to run in production, and production hides the flagged ones from every read: ranking, collection, counts and verification.
§ 06
How to check
Anyone, with the stone's code
- Open the code verification page (the stone's QR leads to it). It checks the signature with the public key and shows the seed, the commitment, the clientSeed, the nonce and the version.
- To check on your own, build the signed message (
genese/v1, the stone's id, the SHA-256 of the seed and the version, one per line) and check the Ed25519 signature against the public key, in any cryptography library.genese/v1 {gemaId} {seedHash} {engineVersion} - After the reveal, check three equalities:
SHA-256(serverSeed) = serverSeedHash HMAC-SHA256(serverSeed, clientSeed + ":" + nonce) = seed SHA-256(seed) = seedHash
Write down the commitment shown in the forge confirmation: it is your proof that the server seed was already fixed beforehand.
With the engine code
The engine code is still closed. An audit with access to it rebuilds any stone from the seed and compares it with the stone shown: it is the same code that runs on the site, in the same frozen versions.
A full audit, with access to the secret and the database
- Each stored serverSeed equals the HMAC-SHA256 of the secret over the label, the account and the day: a hand-picked seed shows up as a mismatch.
- The nonces of each day are continuous, with no gaps or repetitions, and the number of forges does not exceed the limit.
- Every stone points to a forge, and its seed matches the serverSeed, the clientSeed and the nonce of that forge.
- Every combination checks out: the recorded threshold, the number that decided it and the chosen stone.
- The distribution of rarities in each account is consistent with the published odds: a favored account shows up as a statistical deviation.
- All authenticity codes pass verification.
§ 07
What this document still does not guarantee
The current limits, with what is planned to resolve them:
- The platform knows both seeds. The serverSeed and the clientSeed of each account are calculated from a platform secret, and the person cannot yet change the clientSeed. Because of this, whoever holds that secret can calculate in advance the result of the forges of any account. The commitment prevents changing the result afterwards, but does not prevent knowing it beforehand.
- The commitments have no external date. The commitments are kept in the platform's database and on the screen of whoever forges, but not in a public record with a date attested by third parties. Whoever controls the database could, in theory, assemble an entire consistent day; the full audit in section 6 detects this, but it depends on access to the secret.
- The engine code is closed. An outsider can rebuild the seed, but cannot rebuild the stone from it without the engine code.
- The signature proves origin, not impartiality. The private key belongs to the platform: the code proves that the stone came from Gênese, not that it came without interference.
Next reinforcements
- Let the person change the clientSeed at any time: with a seed chosen by the person after seeing the commitment, the platform stops knowing the result beforehand.
- Publish every day a record of all commitments, chained by hash, with a third-party timestamp.
- Rotate the seed secret by period and publish it when the period ends, so anyone can check that no seed was hand-picked.
- Publish the frozen engine code, so anyone can rebuild any stone.
- Keep the secret and the signing key in a hardware security module (HSM) and undergo periodic independent audits.
§ 08
Glossary
- SHA-256
- Hash function: turns any text into a 256-bit number. It is impractical to find the text from the hash or to find two texts with the same hash.
- HMAC-SHA256
- Keyed hash: only whoever has the key can calculate the result, and the result does not reveal the key.
- Commitment
- The hash of a piece of data published before the data is used: it later proves the data did not change.
- nonce
- A counter that never repeats and makes the seed of each forge unique.
- Ed25519
- Digital signature standard: the private key signs, and anyone can check the signature with the public key.
- Calibration
- The simulation of hundreds of millions of formations to measure the frequency of each attribute and each tier.